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I. INTRODUCTION
Two familiar human proclivities are tolerable enough within limits but
can cause mischief when we are not wary. The first is the propensity to
suppose that, where a particular form of turpitude has been common in the
lead-up to some salient catastrophe, the best way to prevent such
catastrophes in future is to punish the associated form of turpitude.' The
second proclivity is the tendency to suppose that the tools or, within the
academy, analytic methodologies with which one is most familiar can be
effective even in domains with which one is not very familiar.2
Both of these tendencies have been in evidence in the wake of the
2008-2009 financial dramas and their continuing aftermath. The first has
been manifest in claims to the effect that "what went wrong" in the lead-up
to 2008 was simply a matter of unprecedented greed and associated fraud
on the part of venal bankers, such that jailing our Dimons and Blankfeins
and Lewises will offer the best means of avoiding a replay in future. The
second tendency has been manifest in associated suggestions, in this case
heard more from the scholars than from the activists, that "better
governance" of our financial institutions will avoid "excessive risk-taking"
in the future and thereby prevent the next crisis.
There is no doubt-none at all-that regulatory violations and outright
criminality were rampant in the lead-up to 2008.' There also is little doubt
that, as corporate governance scholars would have it, more conscientious
attention on the part of firm fiduciaries to the long-term health both of
financial firms and of the environments within which they operate is
something worth seeking. I am convinced, however, that neither of these
species of "reform" can suffice to render the financial system, as
distinguished from particular institutions operating within it, safe and
sound. And so I am skeptical that jailing more bankers or tweaking the
1. Where prevention involves post hoc punishment, an additional human proclivity might be
satisfied-the tendency to seek retribution.
2. A variation, this, on the old saw that when one holds a hammer, everything looks like a
nail.
3. See, e.g., Joe Pinsker, Why Aren't Any Bankers in Prison for Causing the Financial Crisis?,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/why-arent-any-
bankers-in-prison-for-causing-the-financial-crisis/496232/.
4. See, e.g., Klaus J. Hopt, Better Governance ofFinancial Institutions (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Working Paper No. 207/2013, 2013), http://personal.1se.ac.uk/schustee/hopt%20governance.pdf;
Hamid Mehran et al., Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned from the Financial
Crisis? (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 502, 2011), https://www.newyorkfed.org/
medialibrary/media/research/staff reports/sr502.pdf; see also works cited infra Part IV.
5. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf
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duties of bank fiduciaries will get us where we want to go-however
desirable such measures might be on other grounds.
In this Symposium Article I shall attempt to explain and defend my
skepticism, then convert it to a new face of optimism. I claim that "what
goes wrong"-or at any rate, most consequentially wrong-in episodes of
financial dysfunction has little to do with the violation of norms of legality,
morality, or even rationality, and hence that crashes like that of 2008 can
occur even among societies of angelic Mr. Spocks. I then claim that it
follows from this observation that no form of piecemeal tinkering with the
duties of financial fiduciaries-that is, agents whom the law requires to act
faithfully on behalf of private sector principals who participate in the
financial markets-as presently constituted can assist more than marginally
in heading off market catastrophe. Rather than operating at the level of
persons or firms, in short, we must work at the level of systems-systems
that are more than mere sums of their parts.6 And that means either
wholesale regulatory overhaul, or-what might come to the same thing-
wholesale rethinking of whom bank fiduciaries always, not just in crisis,
are really fiduciaries for.
My argument proceeds as follows: The next Part elaborates and
defends my claim that financial dysfunction is not primarily a product of
defects of legality, morality, or even rationality. I argue that bubbles and
busts are instead species of what I call "recursive collective action
problems." These are circumstances in which iterated, mutually responsive,
perfectly rational decisions aggregate into calamitous outcomes.
Circumstances of this sort, I demonstrate, are particularly rife in financial
markets and indeed macroeconomies more broadly. And this means a host
of problems that we must address in finance are not addressable by
targeting defects of rationality, morality, or even legality on the part of
private market participants.
Part III then turns to the "deep structure" of fiduciary relations,
pursuant to which one person acts in the stead of another. Because such
acts include the same (innocent) behaviors as those discussed in Part II, I
argue, private law fiduciary duty offers little, if any, solution to recursive
collective action problems of the kind discussed in that Part-at least if
private market participants are the beneficiaries of the duty in question.
This is because that which renders the decisions that enter into collective
action problems unobjectionable when taken by private sector principals
carries over to the case of such decisions being taken by fiduciaries who act
6. For further elaboration of the significance of talk of "parts" and "sums of parts" here, see
Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional "Safety and Soundness" to Systemic
"Financial Stability" in Financial Oversight, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2015).
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on behalf of those principals. And this in turn means that bubbles and busts,
as species of recursive collective action problems, are simply not amenable
to solution by tweaking the duties of private sector fiduciaries.
Part IV then considers whether there is anything unique in the duties of
bank and other financial fiduciaries that might underwrite an exception to
the conclusions reached in Part III. It finds that while there is much that is
unique-or in bank regulatory parlance, "special"-about banks and other
financial institutions, little of what is ordinarily identified as such carries
over to the duties of their fiduciaries. The reason, I argue, is that what is
most saliently special about these institutions stems from their systemic
relations with the sovereign public, not with the internal relations between
themselves and their fiduciaries. Hence, while we might well reasonably
wish to impose heightened standards on bank and other financial
fiduciaries going forward, no such duties will be private sector fiduciary
duties. They will be either regulations or they will be duties of bank
officers and directors reconceived as public fiduciaries, not private ones.
Part V then concludes.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL DYSFUNCTION
That which renders banks special, vulnerability-wise, is typically said
to be the "maturity-transformative" character of their business model.
Banks borrow short and lend long. This notoriously leaves them prone to
"panics" or "runs." Runs, in turn, are more or less widely recognized, at
least by reasonably sophisticated observers, to be collective action
problems-problems in which multiple individually rational actions can
aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes.7 Until 2008, however, one
additional fact seems to have been less widely recognized, while two more
important facts seem to be inadequately recognized even now.
The first additional fact is that banks' maturity-transformative business
model has long since spread beyond banking to other sectors of the
financial system. Repo and derivative markets, to take two conspicuous
examples, had by 2008 become quite as vulnerable to runs as the banks
were before federal deposit insurance.8 Hence the recognition by some,
even before 2008, that the financial system now had a "shadow" banking
7. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983).
8. See generally the now regularly cited commentary by my colleague Paul McCulley. Paul A.
McCulley, Teton Reflections, PIMCO (Sept. 2007), https://www.pimco.com/insights/economic-and-
market-commentary/global-central-bank-focus/teton-reflections (coining the term "shadow banking" in
an address to fellow participants in the 2007 Federal Reserve Bank conference at Jackson Hole,
Wyoming).
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sector operating in parallel with the traditional banking sector.9 And hence
many of Dodd-Frank's provisions that pertain, not to banks as such, but to
derivatives markets and market utilities as well.' 0
While the significance of shadow banking has come to be widely
recognized, however, two other aspects of bank and shadow bank
vulnerability do not yet appear to be adequately appreciated. The first is
that banks and shadow banks are subject not merely to collective action
problems, but to what I call recursive such problems, which are much
worse in magnitude." This means that these problems threaten to bring not
merely harm, but calamity.12
The second fact is that, to solve a collective action problem, you really
need a form of collective agency to deal with the problem.' 3 You require
agents able to act in the name of all members of the collectivity in
question-indeed, often, the public as a whole-rather than merely some of
them. 14 This means, we'll see, that to look to the duties of private sector
fiduciaries is to look in the wrong direction where the worst financial perils
are concerned. If we are set on appealing to the notion of fiduciary
obligation in this sphere, we are going to have to start thinking in terms of
public, not private, fiduciaries.
We will better appreciate the truth of these claims by first looking more
carefully at the nature of what I call recursive collective action problems.
As noted before, these are vulnerabilities that seem especially pervasive in
financial markets and sectors of the macroeconomy that link up
significantly with those markets.
A. Recursive Collective Action Problems
What I am labeling recursive collective action problems, or "recaps"
for short, are pervasive in financial markets and indeed macroeconomies
more generally.' 5 In fact, many of the most vexing challenges familiar to
observers of financial systems and monetary economies are best understood
9. Id
10. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit.
VII-VIII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1822 (2010).
11. See Robert C. Hockett, Recursive Collective Action Problems: The Structure ofProcyclicality
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as examples of this general type.' 6 It is accordingly somewhat surprising
that recaps have been so little studied.
Let's begin with a quick definition.' 7 That which I call a recursive
collective action problem is a situation in which (1) multiple decisions that
are individually rational in the absence of coordination (2) aggregate into
collectively irrational outcomes, which outcomes then (3) render it rational
for agents to take yet more decisions along the same lines as in (1), which
then compounds the irrationality at work in (2), ad infinitum.8 Conditions
(1) and (2) are what render these problems "collective action" problems.
Condition (3) is what renders them "recursive," possessed of the familiar
feedback-fed, self-exacerbating property that deprives some interactions
among multiple agents of tolerable equilibria. It will be helpful to say a bit
more about each of these three conditions.
1. Individually Rational
The form of rationality involved in a recap is familiar to economists
and other choice theorists. Per this form of rationality, chosen means are
reasonably believed by choosing agents to conduce to desired ends.19
Typically some form of "maximization" is involved in the choosing, in that
the agent's choices are consistent with maximizing the degree to which
some antecedent preference or set of preferences is satisfied.20 The
shepherds familiar to the commons tragedy, for example, aim to maximize
the availability of nutrients to their animals. 2 1 The prisoners perplexed by
the prisoners' dilemma, for their part, aim to minimize terms of
imprisonment, hence to maximize time out of jail.22
There are, of course, well-known objections to "instrumental," or
"means-ends" conceptions of rationality of this general sort. There are
16. Id.
17. The remainder of this Part draws heavily on Hockett, supra note 11.
18. Or at any rate, ad sub-optimum, in a sense to be further elaborated below.
19. The consensus chQice for locus classicus of this take on rationality appears to be DAVID
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L.A. Selby-Biggie ed., Clarendon Press 1896) (1739). Since
MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons, trans.,
Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1904-1905), it has been common to refer to this form of rationality
as instrumental.
20. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 19.
21. The reference is to Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SC. 1243 (1968),
which popularized the notion of commons tragedies first publicly lectured upon by William Forster
Lloyd. See W. F. LLOYD, TWO LECTURES ON THE CHECKS TO POPULATION (1833).
22. The "Prisoners' Dilemma" is surely the best known of game-theoretic choice situations,
discussed in every text on the subject. The original formulation of the dilemma appears to have been




complaints that it has no positive explanatory value, for example, in view
of the ease with which putative ends can be recharacterized post hoc as to
rationalize means and the ends to which they conduce.23 There also are
Aristotelian objections to the effect that ends, too, can be (now
normatively) rational or irrational, meaning that instrumentalist accounts of
rationality A la Hume are too limiting given the concept of rationality's
ineluctably normative valence.2 4
None of these concerns, important as they are in other contexts, need
trouble us here once acknowledged. Our purpose here is to show that in
some circumstances, even those in which the applicability of this form of
rationality appears to be uncontroversial, everyone's doing the individually
rational thing in isolation can issue in everyone's doing the collectively
irrational thing in aggregate. And, crucially, this can occur in a manner that
not only prevents maximization of what each agent individually prefers, but
even can maximize what each individual disprefers.
2. Collectively Irrational
The "collective irrationality" involved in a recap is to be understood by
reference to the individual rationality whose end it frustrates. It involves
subversion of precisely that end which the agents in question are rationally
seeking in their disaggregated, individual capacities. This is precisely why
the individually rational decisions that aggregate into an irrational outcome
are said to be collectively irrational, or "collectively self-defeating." It is
also why the resultant choice situation can be labeled, as I shall label it,
"tragic," "ironic," or "paradoxical." The understanding upon which these
characterizations are predicated is that the individual decisions are
(rationally) aimed at something-some end-and that the particular
circumstance in which those decisions are being taken is structured in such
a way as renders the end more elusive precisely when all individuals do the
rational thing-i.e., when they (rationally) pursue it.
23. This and related concerns are nicely laid out and discussed, for example, in JOSt Luis
BERMIlDEZ, DECISION THEORY AND RATIONALITY (2009). Among the more searching and
pioneering of contemporary investigations of decision theory and rationality are the papers
collected in DONALDDAVIDSON, ESSAYS ONACTIONS ANDEVENTS (2d ed. 2001).
24. See, for example, PHILIPPA FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS (2001), for a philosophically
sophisticated, Aristotelian meditation on the rational critique to which ends can be subject. For a
cognate jurisprudential take on the subject, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1980). For an early expression of skepticism about instrumental rationality by two
economists, see George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REv. 76 (1977).
[Vol. 68:4:10711078
Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?
3. Recursively Self-Amplifying
What renders a recursive collective action problem recursive is its self-
amplification characteristics, which are in turn rooted in part in the
maximization behavior associated with instrumental rationality itself as
characterized in the previous two Subparts. The recursion at work here, in
other words, stems in part from the form of rationality described in Part
II.A.1 just as the irrationality described in II.A.2 does. Indeed, the element
of recursion stems from the mutual interaction of individually rational
decisions themselves when decisions can be iterated.
In essence, the process runs thus: Individuals first act rationally-and
separately, without coordination-each to maximize the value of some
desired variable, call it x. In so doing they employ means that, absent the
presence of other actors, are well adapted to the task of maximization.
Multiple individuals acting thus individually rationally, however, not only
frustrates the maximizing purpose, but actually works to minimize that
purpose's satisfaction. Individuals have less of what they seek (less x), in
other words, after all of them seek more than they would have had if none
of them had sought to maximize (rather than, say, "satisfice") in the first
place.25
When this happens, however, individuals do not adjust their
preferences. Instead they repeat their maximizing actions, since their ends
are still unfulfilled and indeed less fulfilled than they would have been had
not everyone acted individually rationally. Hence the process repeats itself,
ad infinitum, such that each round of individually rational decision-making
paradoxically carries each individually rational agent further from maximal
x. No tolerable equilibrium, in other words, characterizes these sets of
interactive decisions. They are in this sense procyclical-a fact that bears
critically upon their salience for finance-regulatory and macroeconomic
purposes as discussed further below.
B. Some Examples
I noted above that recaps are pervasive, and that they are particularly
common in the guise of many procyclicalities that afflict financial markets
25. In referencing the concept of satisficing, I am of course alluding to the work of Herbert
Simon, particularly as encountered in HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (3d ed.
1976), and Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCHOL.
REV. 129 (1956). The idea is that cognitive limitations in many circumstances render optimization
behavior taking the form of boundless maximization quite futile, such that decision-making often
does better to proceed on the basis of some threshold of acceptability rather than some
maximandum. Careful philosophic treatment of Simon's idea can be found in MICHAEL SLOTE,
BEYOND OPTIMIZING: ASTUDYOF RATIONALCHOICE (1989).
2017] 1079
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and macroeconomies. It will be helpful now to run through a few examples.
This will both aid intuition and underwrite understanding of what is
required to solve this particularly vexing form of challenge. To help insure
that desired outcome, I choose all but the first example with financial
market applications in mind.
1. Arms Races
Let's begin with a simple example, relative to which subsequent
examples constitute only slightly more complex variations. We first
consider two parties, each of whom aims to maintain parity with-or
perhaps, under conditions of uncertainty, to maintain a certain "margin of
safety" relative to-the other by stockpiling an equal or marginally greater
number of weapons than the other. The ultimate aim in each party's case is
to maximize and maintain something we'll call "security." 2 6
Given this end, it is instrumentally rational, absent coordination, for
Party 1 to define his aim relative to Party 2's stockpile-say, by aiming for
rough parity with Party 2's stockpile, or for parity with Party 2's stockpile
plus some small increment d to compensate for uncertainty as to just how
large Party 2's stockpile actually is. The problem here, of course, is that, as
in all collective action problems, what's sauce for the goose is likewise
sauce for the gander. It is just as rational for Party 2 to define her aim
relative to Party I's stockpile-say, by aiming for parity with Party I's
stockpile plus increment d-as it is for Party 1 to define his aim relative to
Party 2's stockpile. The parties' aims are in this sense mutual-they are
mutually regarding-and that is in fact part of the problem. It is the sense
in which the problem is group-mediated and internally "interactive," hence
apt to be iterated.
And so, if you'll pardon a pun, we are off to the races. Starting from a
position of rough but uncertain parity, Party 1 adds d to his stockpile "just
to make sure." Party 2 responds by adding 2d to hers-d to match, another
d just to make sure. Party 1 then responds to the response by adding 3d to
his-2d to match, plus another d's worth to achieve a buffer. And so on.
The race is self-reinforcing and self-exacerbating. It is recursively
procyclical.
26. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, ARMS AND INFLUENCE (1966); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING & MORTON H. HALPERIN, STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL (1961); THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Much more, of course, has been written on the
structure and dynamics of various species of arms race, much of it for obvious reasons during the
period extending from the late 1940s through the late 1980s. Indeed much of the early work in
"game theory" itself, a good bit of it sponsored by the RAND Corporation, appears to have been
occasioned by the arms race dynamic of the Cold War. And earlier contributions, dating back to
the 1930s, themselves of course came along during times of significant international tension.
1080 [Vol. 68:4:1071
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Arms accordingly accumulate and expenses grow with them, ad
infinitum. Yet the parties are no better off, security-wise, late in the game
than they are early in the game. Indeed they are likely much worse off even
on the security front alone, quite irrespective of pecuniary expense, given
both (1) the dangers of stockpiled weapons and (2) the temptations to
launch preemptive wars during brief intervals of relative advantage,
occasioned by all arms races. Hence the race is enormously wasteful and
downright destructive-a sheer deadweight loss for both parties both in
pecuniary and in security terms. And in this sense it subverts the very ends
in terms of which the parties' means-rationality is to be understood.
Of course the example is stylized. Real arms races are more complex
and nuanced than this. But the essential idea applicable to all variations on
the stylized example is nevertheless clear: The aim of each party is greater
security attained cost-effectively; and yet the race, by steadily increasing
the quantum of arms and encouraging preemptive aggression during brief
intervals when advantages are had, renders all less secure, while also
occasioning enormous pecuniary expense. And things only grow worse in
these very respects with each iteration.
Critically, moreover-a point that will figure quite prominently
below-neither party can unilaterally quit, let alone stop, the race without
thereby relinquishing its aim of security. That is why unilateral
disarmament is nearly universally eschewed and repudiated. It is as
individually irrational to stop racing, in other words, as it is individually
rational and collectively irrational to continue racing. You're damned if
you do, collectively and hence ultimately individually, and damned if you
don't, individually. This is precisely the sense in which arms races, like all
collective action problems, are tragic (in the original, Attic Greek sense of
the word).
2. Consumer Price Inflations
Now suppose it is Tuesday, and that you ordinarily purchase your
groceries on Fridays. Some of your neighbors typically do likewise, while
others typically shop Thursdays and still others shop Wednesdays. All of
you now suddenly notice that prices advertised on the grocery store
billboards are higher today than they were yesterday. Some of you also had
noticed last week that prices then were a bit higher than they were several
days earlier. It might begin to look likely, then, that prices will be higher
later this week than they are now. This might be so even if, in fact,
whatever induced the earlier price rises-e.g., some underlying
"fundamental" such as a temporary, accident-induced grain shortage-is no
longer at work by this point.
Alabama Law Review
Against this backdrop, it might well appear to be individually rational
for you to purchase your groceries today, Tuesday, rather than waiting until
Friday. Prices might very well, after all, be higher by then. Matters will
look likewise to your neighbors: today, Tuesday, looks better than
Wednesday or Thursday to them as well. For again, prices might well be
higher by then. So each of you and your neighbors rationally accelerate
your purchase of groceries. You buy today rather than later in the week
when prices might be higher.
But now note that all of your acting rationally in this manner can bring
on or worsen the very eventuality in the contemplation of which you have
chosen to shop now. All of you drive prices yet higher than they would
otherwise be by accelerating your demand for the products you're buying.
But that fact cannot warrant refraining from purchasing on the part of any
of you acting separately, for none of you can single-handedly prevent
prices rising any more than you can stop the most salient losses wrought by
an arms race by unilaterally disarming.
You are accordingly once again damned if you do, collectively, and
damned if you don't, individually. And matters of course continue to
unfold in this manner, and indeed worsen, indefinitely. For your all-
inducing price acceleration gives you reason to accelerate purchasing
behavior yet further, thereby inducing yet more rapid price acceleration,
and so on, procyclically.
Some such dynamic as this is what characterizes any self-reinforcing,
procyclical consumer price inflation or "spiral," as they used to be called.
On the one hand, it is individually rational, once prices seem likely to rise
somewhat in future, to act preemptively by accelerating one's purchasing
decisions. Insofar as one's expectations of such price rises are plausible,
moreover, it is symmetrically irrational not to do so. And yet, everyone's
continuing on the treadmill collectively brings on and steadily worsens
precisely those losses that stepping onto the treadmill is meant individually
to minimize.
3. Asset Price Bubbles
Now consider again the immediately preceding example-that of a
consumer price inflation-but change the object of purchase from groceries
to financial assets of one sort or another. In addition, for at least some
cases, add one more element to the story-viz. the availability of credit at
low cost to purchase the assets in question, which latter one can sell after
appreciation to pay off one's debt while still pocketing a nontrivial
1082 [Vol. 68:4:1071
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margin. In such cases, we shall have told the tale of an asset price bubble,
which is merely a price inflation in respect of financial assets rather than
grocenes.
In the credit-augmented case, for its part, we shall simply have told the
tale of a particularly dangerous-because even less amplitude-limited-
rendition of such inflation. Indeed, where credit comes into the picture, the
asset price bubble can readily become something more than a mere
inflation. It can become a full hyperinflation, pursuant to which price rises
occurring at, say, velocity v during one iteration directly induce further
rises at velocities exceeding v over subsequent iterations.
There are two reasons for financial assets' being particularly vulnerable
to this pattern, both of which constitute sides of one coin. First, people
often-perhaps typically-purchase financial assets these days less to
consume or even to "hold" them than to "flip" or resell them. Hence there
is no natural "satiation" point where their purchase is concerned as there is
in the case of most consumer goods. Buyers will buy for as long as the
prices are rising, and indeed aim to profit by sales after such price rises in
ways that they typically do not, save in exceptional circumstances, in the
case of consumer price inflations. Second, because, in light of the first
point, people will rationally borrow in order to buy for as long as the asset
price rises exceed rises in credit costs-something that is, again, much less
common in consumer goods markets, even when consumer credit is
available-there is no "natural," consumption-rooted limit to the price
levels that might be attained by financial assets. These can rationally rise
for as long as credit remains sufficiently cheaply available to purchase
them.28
Since a credit-fueled asset price bubble is just a (particularly
dangerous) form of inflation, it bears the same rationality structure as an
inflation. It is individually rational, instrumentally speaking, for market
participants to borrow in order to buy financial assets for as long as their
prices rise faster than credit costs-for as long as, that is, there is a
"spread" for speculative buyers to arbitrage or "leg." By the same token,
however, it is just as collectively irrational, again instrumentally speaking,
for market participants to keep participating. For at some inherently
27. For present purposes, "low cost" credit can be either or both of (a) credit available at low
interest rates and (b) credit available on the basis of little down payment or collateral-hence high
leverage availability.
28. For fuller elaboration of this point, as well as careful comparison and contrast of credit-
fueled asset price hyperinflations and more garden variety consumer price inflations, see Robert
Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 1213 (2010) [hereinafter Hockett, A
Fixer- Upper for Finance]. See also Robert Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, CHALLENGE,
Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 36; Robert Hockett, Bubbles, Busts, and Blame, 37 CORNELL L. FORUM 14
(2011).
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uncertain point the credit will run dry; people will begin selling off assets
to pay down their debts left from earlier credit-financed purchases; and
prices will then commence dropping at least as precipitously as they rose,
leaving debt deflation and consequent recessionary spiral in their wake.29
And yet, once again, no individual can unilaterally terminate either process.
It should also be noted, if only in passing, how the individual
rationality of decisions to purchase assets during the course of a bubble can
in effect radiate outward, rendering other decisions at least temporarily
rational as well. It is more rational, for example, at least for a time, to lend
to an otherwise less worthy borrower during a credit-fueled asset price
hyperinflation, at least if the asset to be purchased with the loaned funds is
itself to collateralize the loan, for the expected value of the loan rises with
the value of the collateral. It is likewise more rational, for similar reasons,
to "extend" oneself further as a borrower under such circumstances, as well
as to assign higher credit ratings as a rater to borrowers. And if one is in
competition with others, it is not only individually rational to do these
things, but individually irrational not to do them-for reasons similar to
those that oblige arms race participants to keep racing.
It also bears noting that it is even individually rational under the
circumstances here described, for some of the same reasons, for some so-
called functional regulators to permit more on the part of borrowers and
lenders than they would otherwise do-at least if, like other functional
regulators, they are regulating individual persons or institutions for their
individual "safety and soundness" rather than entire financial systems for
their "systemic stability."30 That last proviso offers a hint as to what we
shall have to conclude below in Parts II.C and II.D in the way of how to
address recaps. The key is to supplement traditional fiduciary duties and
"microprudential" regulatory regimes, whose injunctions can tend toward
procyclicality precisely in virtue of the recursive collective action problems
to which regulated persons and entities are subject, with system-focused,
countercyclically operating "macroprudential" regulatory regimes of the
type discussed below in Parts II.C and II.D.
29. See sources cited supra note 28.
30. See Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra note 28, on this point. For yet more onthe
critical distinction between institutional and systemic focus on the part of financial regulators, see
Hockett, supra note 6, and Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Private" Means to "Public"
Ends: Governments as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53 (2014). See also Robert
C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets: Toward a Developmental
Finance State, 93 WASH. U. L. REsv. 103 (2015) [hereinafter Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors in
Private Markets].
31. See sources cited supra note 30.
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4. "Leverage" Arms Races
Suppose now there is an asset price bubble underway. For the reasons
rehearsed in connection with that phenomenon just above, it is rational not
only for individual investors to take part but also for financial institutions
to do so. After all, much of the income derived by these institutions derives
from investment activity. Now recall one more observation made in
connection with asset price bubbles-it is individually rational not only to
buy in these circumstances but also to borrow in order to buy as much as
possible. For one borrows at fixed rates, while asset prices rise at
accelerating rates, during bubbles.
When a financial institution borrows in order to invest, we say that it
"levers" its purchases of investment assets. It relies on leverage. The
alternative to relying on leverage, if I may oversimplify a bit for expository
purposes, is reliance upon either the firm's own money or owner money-
shareholder equity. This alternative is of course safer than leverage,
inasmuch as the firm owes itself and its shareholders nothing in the event
that investments go bust. Reliance on leverage, by contrast, exposes the
firm to potential insolvency in the event that investments go bust-after a
crash, it can end up owing more than it owns.
So there is a balance to be struck, where financial institutions just as
individual investors are concerned, between highly profitable but risky
reliance on leverage on the one hand, and much less profitable but also
much safer retention of equity-"capital buffers"-on the other hand. But
now consider what is apt to happen when multiple financial firms are in
competition with one another during an asset price boom. Firm 1's officers
might be inclined to maintain a margin of safety by seeking the equivalent
of, say, 10% of its balance sheet in the form of partner or shareholder
equity. Firm 2's officers might be similarly inclined, yet might also see that
they can boost profits by knocking the buffer back to, say, 8% and using
more borrowings to lever up the balance sheet. The greater profitability that
additional leverage brings will attract more clients and thereby lower the
firm's cost of capital, including equity capital itself. It might indeed peel
away many of Firm 1's clients, thereby raising Firm 1's cost of capital.
Firm 1 might accordingly have to respond. It might now lower its buffer
from, say, 10% to 6%, undercutting Firm 2. Firm 2 will then find it
profitable to respond to Firm 1's response. And so on.
The structure here is, of course, identical to that in the conventional
arms race. Each firm is acting rationally, and yet the "financial system" that
these two firms constitute is becoming steadily more risky as capital
buffers drop and aggregate leverage rises. This is the case even if all
firms-and their investors, and their fiduciaries-would rather maintain
higher capital buffers. For the crucial thing is, again as in the arms race,
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that no one participant can end the race. Unilateral disarmament here, in
the midst of a competition, means losing profits, hence losing investors to
other firms, hence losing more profits as the firm's cost of capital rises, and
so on, in the familiar downward spiral.
This suggests two things we shall have to take up in more detail below.
First, capital regulation-and many other forms of macroprudential, i.e.
systemic risk regulation-can be likened to enforceable arms control
agreements. They can deliver what people wish-safer competition-but
are unable to supply acting severally rather than jointly through the state.
And second, in the absence of such regulation, financial fiduciaries who
take on more risk for their firms are doing what is actually "good" for the
firm and its constituents, at least for as long as the un- or inadequately
regulated competition endures.
5. Bank Runs
Now to an example with which all finance-regulatory scholars are at
least passingly familiar. Consider a system of fractional reserve banking
without deposit insurance. All depositors in a certain bank know that the
bank does not have sufficient liquid assets on hand to accommodate all of
them should they all decide to withdraw all of their funds at one instant.
This does not ordinarily trouble them, however, because (1) it is in general
highly unlikely that all depositors will wish to withdraw all funds at one
time, and (2) the bank's investing a large portion of all deposits in assets
less liquid than cash enables the bank to earn returns that are passed on in
part to depositors in the form of interest borne by their accounts.
But suppose now that some rumor or other piece of information
apparently bearing upon the bank's ultimate solvency, which for whatever
reason is not implausible even if happening to be false, begins to spread
among depositors. Each depositor knows that in the event that the bank's
solvency really is shaky, the bank will not be able to pay all of its
depositors what it owes them. Hence any depositor who is early in the
queue to withdraw funds will be less likely than other depositors to lose
anything. At the same time, should the information that has occasioned
concern ultimately prove untrue, any such depositor can simply place her
funds back in the same or some other bank without loss once the truth is
established. So she loses virtually nothing by going ahead and withdrawing
early,32 while she risks losing everything if she does not.
What all of this means, of course, is that all depositors can find it
individually rational to seek to beat all of the others to the bank to
32. She suffers only the inconvenience of the withdrawal and ultimate redeposit.
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withdraw, and indeed individually irrational not to do so. No one depositor
can end the run unilaterally, after all. It also means that with each
withdrawal by someone other than you, the likelihood grows that you
might lose something or everything should your bank fail. In effect, then, a
form of recursive "bums rush" much like an arms race can commence, with
every individual withdrawal rendering further such withdrawals that much
more prudent-more rational-and hence likely. The run is in this sense
self-reinforcing. It is recursive.
If a race like this does commence, and the bank is actually solvent at
bottom, the depositors will then have brought on the very eventuality in
contemplation of which they have acted. The liquidity crisis with which
they confront the bank will in such case have transitioned into a full-blown
solvency crisis, leaving most depositors empty-handed in the aftermath.
And this can be so, again, even where the bank is, absent the run, perfectly
solvent at its core. What is more, inasmuch as the "information" that
precipitates such a run on one bank often can be as little as "news" to the
effect that there have been runs on some other banks, the run phenomenon
can bring down an entire banking system-indeed, before deposit
insurance, it often did.33 Such is the sense in which bank runs are often
described as "contagious." 34 So contagion itself can be underwritten by
what is at bottom a recursive collective action problem.
As with the arms race, then, so with the race to the bank during a run:
multiple individually-and at each iteration, increasingly-rational
decisions here aggregate into a collectively-and with each iteration,
increasingly-irrational, self-defeating outcome for all but a very few
depositors. The only exceptions are those who are first in the queue, who
might be analogized to arms racers who succeed in launching preemptive
strikes against other arms racers. It is perhaps theoretically possible for
someone to "win" such races, but by far most parties "lose," with the
likelihood of winning sufficiently low for each racer as to render the race
itself worse, in a probabilistic sense, for each racer than would be no race at
all. And yet also here, as again in the typical arms racing case, no single
racer can stop the race or exit it in any satisfactory manner by unilaterally
disarming.
33. See, for example, the colorful instances in past U.S. banking history recounted in GARY B.
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
34. For an account of that contagion that marked the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s,
see, for example, Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to "Mission Creep": Defending the IMF's
Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial Stability, 41 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153 (2002).
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6. Asset Price "Fire Sales" (or "Busts")
Now consider the bank run example adduced above and slightly alter
the object of the activity in question. Change the asset from which one
"runs" from a bank deposit to a financial instrument saleable on the
securities markets. In such case we shall have a run on assets, a.k.a. fire
sale, which is structurally identical to a run on a bank. A holder of the asset
receives plausible information-perhaps no more than rumors-concerning
the issuer or asset's ultimate soundness. She knows that if others receive
the same information and begin selling their holdings, the asset will quickly
lose value in the market. It is accordingly in her interest-it is individually
rational, instrumentally speaking-to sell her holdings before others sell
theirs. That way, she minimizes pecuniary loss and salvages value. This is
all the more true insofar as she always can purchase the asset back-
possibly even at lower, post-panic cost-should the earlier information
prove ultimately unfounded.
Once again, however, what is sauce for the goose here is sauce for the
gander. It is just as individually rational for most or all other holders of the
asset to aim to be quick to shed holdings as it is for the first agent. But lo,
everyone's acting instrumentally rationally in this way brings on the very
result that was feared-a precipitous drop of the asset's value and
associated collective calamity. And each such drop induces further such
drops at accelerating rates, per the familiar recursive, feedback-fed
dynamic. As in the bank run example, moreover, all of this will be so even
if the rumors prove ultimately to have been unfounded, and no individual
can stop the rumor-fed process from occurring.
At the same time, however, the run on assets example stands to the
bank run example rather as the asset price bubble example stands to the
consumer price inflation example: losses are magnified here because busts
follow bubbles in which agents have incurred significant debt in making
their bubble-magnified purchases. Those debt obligations do not fall with
the prices of assets that the borrowed funds have purchased, meaning that
people are left with significant "debt overhang" in the wakes of these busts
in a manner they're not after typical bank runs. They are left "underwater."
This is precisely why recessionary spirals of the kind considered above
are most severe after credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts-which
latter themselves are among the most forceful of "shocks" of the sort
mentioned there. Those with debt overhang don't spend as do those without
overhang. They (slowly) pay down debt. Hence Irving Fisher's profound
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diagnosis of the depression of the 1930s as a "debt deflation." 35 Much of
the world is living in the aftermath of such a debt deflation even at the time
of this writing-a deflation following that asset price hyperinflation that
went into reverse, then to bust, between 2007 and 2009.36
It also bears noting here that, just as in the case of the asset price
bubble, so here with the bust, that which renders it instrumentally rational
for individuals to act in manners that aggregate into collectively
dysfunctional outcomes also can render it rational for other agents to act
reinforcingly. It is financially rational, for example, for a creditor who sees
her debtor's collateral plummeting in value either to accelerate the debt or
to place a "margin call" demanding that the collateral be topped off-all
the more so if mark-to-market accounting practices are widely followed or
even imposed by regulators.
It is similarly rational for microprudential regulators, who key liquidity
or capital requirements to asset risk, to demand more buffer of regulated
entities whose asset values begin dropping during such runs. But that in
turn further fuels such fire sales-liquidations-of assets as partly
constitute the run itself. Creditors and microprudential regulators
accordingly act procyclically here just as they do during the price run-ups
that are the antecedent bubbles. They do so because they are individually
rational while caught in the grip of a recursive collective action problem.
The problem is ultimately soluble only by means of the kind sketched
below in Parts I.C and II.D.
C. How We Solve Them
Recursive collective action problems, as just characterized, are both
formidable and, often enough, devastating. That they are potentially
devastating is clear from the brief sampling of particular manifestations
provided in Part II.B, all of which involve not merely irony, but indeed
tragic irony. That they are formidable is presumably clear from their
paradoxical-their "ironic"--characteristics as analyzed in Part II.A: they
are collective irrationalities that spring from the aggregation of individual
35. The locus classicus is IRVING FISHER, BOOMS AND DEPRESSIONS: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES
(1932). For a recent diagnosis of the present period as one of Fisher-style debt deflation, see Daniel
Alpert, Robert Hockett & Nouriel Roubini, The Way Forward: Moving from the Post-Bubble, Post-Bust
Economy to Renewed Growth and Competitiveness, POLICY PAPERS (New Am. Found., Wash., D.C.),
Oct. 2011.
36. See sources cited supra note 35.
37. See sources cited supra note 28.
38. See sources cited supra note 28.
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rationalities, the latter of which we cannot expect-or even sensibly wish-
to extirpate. What then to do?
The key, I suggest, lies in focusing upon two of these problems' three
basic features: first, the collective aspect of their collective irrationality;
and second, the rational aspect of their individual rationality. To solve our
most formidable recursive collective action problems, in short, requires our
first assuming collective agency and then collectively acting to render
certain individual decisions-those that aggregate into collective calamity
in each kind of recap-no longer instrumentally rational. The remainder of
this Part briefly elaborates on this fundamental idea.
1. Collective Rationality via Collective Agency
For collectively irrational outcomes to be possible, something has to be
missing-some prerequisite to collective rationation and resultant action.
What is missing, in fact, is a locus or situs at which collective rationation
and associated rationality can operate. In short, what is missing is collective
agency, at least in the sphere of the activity in question-stockpiling arms,
buying goods, purchasing assets, or what have you. To solve a collective
action problem in these spheres requires collective action itself in these
spheres, hence some form of collective agency. The relevant collectivity
must be able to act in concerted fashion, either directly or via some agent
duly authorized to act in the name and on behalf of all in the collectivity.
Where the collectivity in question either is or is part of a polity or some
other aggregate of persons in whom the attributes of sovereignty vest-that
is, a state-the most common form of such agency is a government or
government instrumentality. In a state or other polity, government is the
collective agent par excellence. It is the collective agent under whose
ultimate collectivity-vested authority, and with whose supplemental
assistance of various kinds, all individual and other, substate collective
agents will operate.
Even the most die-hard of libertarians in effect acknowledge this
collective agency function of government-when, for instance, they say
that the "first duty" or "essential role" of governments is "national
defense." The reason is that collective defense itself poses a classic
collective action problem-namely that subspecies typically referred to as
the "free rider problem." 3 9 It is individually rational, the story here runs, for
39. The locus classicus in this case is of course MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965), the ubiquity of which is such as to
lead the present Author almost to wish that he didn't have to cite it. For a skeptical take on the
utility of free-rider problems as explanations or justifications of sundry policy measures, see
RICHARDTUCK, FREE RIDING (2008).
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each member of a collectivity in need of defending to let others do the job
or foot the bill where defense is concerned, then to enjoy the positive
externalities generated by their doing so. Border defense, after all, is a
largely non-excludable public good. But this means that defense will be
systematically underprovided if its provision is left to voluntary
contributions of effort or funds, for it means that the latter is individually
irrational. Hence even in libertarian fantasies, for collective defense at least
the collectivity appropriately authorizes an agent-a government-to
"provide for the collective defense."
How governments discharge the appointed function, however, is as
instructive for present purposes as the fact that they do it. For one way of
looking at conscription, mandatory subscription-a.k.a. taxation-or both
is as means by which those collective agents known as governments render
it no longer individually rational to do that which, when all do it, results in
collective and hence individual calamity. Collectivities in these instances,
in other words, charge their governments with rendering it no longer
instrumentally rational for individuals to attempt to free ride or shirk. Here
lies the key to understanding how best to address all other recaps, including
those sampled in Part II.B.
2. Conforming Individual to Collective Rationality by Collectively
Changing the Individual Calculus
Collective agency is necessary but not sufficient to solve a collective
action problem.
What else is required? The key to our answer lies in that other
constitutive feature of the collective action problem additional to
aggregation-viz. the individual rationality of the decisions that aggregate
into collectively irrational outcomes in these situations. The duly appointed
collective agent must, in short, act in the name of all to change the calculus
of each, such that certain erstwhile individually rational decisions that
aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes cease to be individually
rational.
The idea is easily illustrated. Return for a moment to the collective
defense example just considered. The individually rational decision that
aggregates, when replicated by multiple actors, into calamity absent a
collective agent is the decision to shirk or to free ride. What does a
collective agent then do in this circumstance to avert collective calamity?
The government simply changes the free rider's calculus in either or both
of two ways. It either (1) conscripts the free rider, in effect forcing him to
take up arms on pain of imprisonment or worse; (2) conscripts the free
rider's resources, again on pain of imprisonment or worse, so as to fund the
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collective defense; or (3) does both. Either way, it acts to render free riding
no longer free, hence no longer individually rational.
In effect, government instrumentalities must do the same thing in
solving each of the problem instances considered above in Part II.B. All
that differs from case to case is the particular means employed, which of
course varies according to those salient particulars which distinguish one
recap from another.
In the case of an arms race, for example, parties wishing to stop the
operation of the treadmill simply merge into-they jointly constitute-the
requisite collective agent via the medium of contract (in this case, an arms
control treaty), then mutually authorize subagents to inspect certain sites
and verify mutual compliance with the agreement. Insofar as verification
then can be reasonably relied upon, it becomes no longer rational to
produce or procure more weapons. For doing so will incur significant
costs-those occasioned both by the new weapons purchases and by
subsequent iterations once the race is renewed-while affording no
offsetting benefits, any of which are quickly cancelled out by retaliatory
procurements by competitors.4 0
The best-known collective solution to the bank run problem, as well as
one such solution to a run on financial assets problem, involves rendering it
no longer individually rational to run. In the bank run case, deposit
insurance is of course the best known response in question. By assuring
each depositor that any loss, up to some reasonable ceiling, occasioned by a
bank's failure will be fully compensated, the deposit insurer eliminates the
principal factor-possible loss-that renders running individually rational
in the first place. It thereby prevents mere liquidity troubles from morphing
into full-on insolvencies. While in theory this function can be, and
historically has been, played at least imperfectly by privately ordered bank
liquidity-pooling collectives like clearinghouses, governments with their
monopolies on force and, therefore, taxation authority, hence on the "full
faith and credit" that comes with such authority, often prove much more
reliable.4 1
It should also be noted that deposit insurance, though inherently
countercyclical at least in virtue of its run-stemming properties, can be
designed in more and in less countercyclical renditions. The U.S. Federal
Deposit Insurance system, for example, until 2005, operated procyclically
where its method of premium assessment was concerned. For it assessed
40. See generally sources cited supra note 26.
41. See, for example, GORTON, supra note 33, at 56-57, for more both on the historic role of
clearinghouses in addressing runs and on the design of the Federal Reserve System as a form of
publicly backstopped, quasi-private clearinghouse arrangement.
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premia only when the insurance fund fell below a stipulated floor level,
which of course typically occurred only during times of multiple bank
failures-meaning assessments were made principally during times of
stress in the banking industry.42 Happily, the U.S. Congress rectified this in
2005 and 2006, through legislation that effectively renders the assessment
system countercyclical.43 In effect, then, this legislation implicitly
recognizes deposit insurance's function as a solution to a recursive
collective action problem.
Turning now to the case of a run not on bank deposits but on financial
assets, the collective agent now acts to render it no longer individually
rational to run in a manner analogous, but not identical, to that afforded by
deposit insurance. Here the agent-typically but not necessarily a central
bank-announces its willingness to purchase all assets of a particular type
at some floor rate which, on the one hand, amounts to a "penalty rate"
relative to the asset's price prior to the run, while on the other hand,
constituting a rate well above market rate during the run.
Playing the "market maker of last resort" in this manner, the collective
agent operates from "two sides," as it were, to render it no longer
individually rational to dump assets.4 5 From the "down" side, the collective
agent renders it no longer worthwhile for the asset holder to sell the asset at
a price below the announced threshold, hence effectively prevents the
asset's plummeting below that threshold pursuant to the familiar "self-
fulfilling prophecy" dynamic. From the "up" side, in turn, the collective
agent affords, via the "penalty" in the penalty rate, incentive for asset
holders to hold on to their assets rather than selling them even to the
collective agent-at least where there is reason to suppose that the asset is
being systematically undervalued by the panic-struck market, such that its
value will recover in time once it has weathered the storm via other holders
continuing to hold assets in virtue of the collective agent's guarantee.
It also bears noting that, as in the case of deposit insurance, so here the
collective agent who acts in the requisite manner to address an acute
recursive collective action problem acts countercyclically and, in that
42. See DARRYL E. GETTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41718, FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
FOR BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS 13-14 (2014).
43. See id at 14.
44. See sources cited supra note 30; see also WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A
DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1962) (1873) (first articulating the
importance of the penalty rate).
45. See sources cited supra note 30. The canonical articulation of the vaunted "lender of last
resort" role played by central banks is, of course, BAGEHOT, supra note 44. The ways in which
"market-making" has become the new "lending" for these purposes is discussed in the sources
cited supra note 30, as well as in PERRY MEHRING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011).
2017] 1093
Alabama Law Review
sense, macroprudentially. The agent acts countercyclically in blunting the
recursion, and macroprudentially in acting on behalf of the full collectivity
of participants in the "macro-market" in question-the financial system as
a whole. Any finance-regulatory regime that would aim to be complete
must include at least one such countercyclically acting macroprudential
regulator-a regulator both cognizant of this function and able to discharge
it along the lines sketched in this Part.46
In the case of inflations, deflations, and credit-fueled asset price
bubbles, again the key to solving the problem is for the collective agent to
render no longer individually rational those decisions that tend to aggregate
into the collectively irrational consequences in question. In these cases,
however, the means of doing so combine individual-decision targeting with
more macro-level action.
Begin with the credit-fueled asset price bubble. The key to this
phenomenon, recall, is the spread between low borrowing costs and high
capital appreciation rates during the boom, which makes it individually
rational for market actors to arbitrage, or leg. One means of rendering
participation in the bubble dynamic no longer individually rational, then, is
for the collective agent, now acting as a countercyclical macroprudential
financial regulator, to close that spread from either or both of the two ends.
The authority can thus tax capital gains at gradually higher rates, tax asset-
flipping transactions A la Tobin, tax credit-extensions at gradually higher
rates, or simply place hard limits on extensions of credit or incurrings of
leverage-via lending limits; debt-to-income (DTI) or loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio maxima; or reserve minima, capital minima, or both.47
Turning from individual-decision targeting to more macro-level action,
the collective agent can also rein in credit by blunter means-for example,
by raising interest rates via traditional monetary policy instruments.4 8
Alternatively, the regulator might target particular classes of asset that
seem to be prey to bubble dynamics at a given time by "shorting" those
assets in the markets on which they are traded.49 This would lie somewhere
between more individual-decision targeting action, like margin
requirements, on the one hand, and more macro-level action on the other.
In effect, it would be a bubble-side counterpart to run-side last resort
market-making.
Now consider a consumer price inflation. Here the more familiar
means of collectively addressing the problem is for the collective agent-in
46. See sources cited supra note 30.
47. See sources cited supra note 30.
48. See sources cited supra note 30.
49. See sources cited supra note 30.
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most jurisdictions, the central bank or monetary authority-to render
accelerated purchases no longer individually rational by reining in the
credit-money supply via traditional monetary policy measures: more
restrictive discounting, interbank rate setting, and open market operations
in treasury or other securities. By "tightening money" in this manner, the
hope is that the authority will induce market participants into holding off
on their purchases longer, thereby draining off price-pushing pressures
brought on by excessively high-frequency purchasing activity. In so doing,
the authority in question is of course once again acting countercyclically.
And in doing that, it is implicitly acting to solve a recursive collective
action problem.
Though the method of tight money is more broad-brush and blunt than
the more carefully targeted macroprudential tools mentioned in the
previous paragraph but one, it bears noting that those more narrowly
targeted tools could in effect be at least partly approached in the realm of
consumer goods and services markets. A central bank or monetary
authority could, for example, as noted in the previous paragraph, engage in
open market operations that target financial instruments other than
treasuries, thereby tamping down inflations that afflict some submarkets
more than others. By the same token, it could place a floor under some
goods or services while simultaneously pushing back on inflationary
pressures in respect of other goods and services. In a sense, innovation of
this sort is of course already underway, via a form of the market-maker of
last resort function noted just above, in the case of the Federal Reserve's
treatment of housing-associated financial assets.
Solving a recursive collective action problem, such as most of the most
poignant challenges faced by banking and financial markets are, then,
requires collective agency deployed with a view to rendering no longer
individually rational those decisions which, when interacting in iterative
fashion, aggregate into collectively irrational outcomes. This, I shall argue,
tightly limits the circumstances under which systemic financial dysfunction
can be dealt with via fiduciary duty. Our only options are to (a) alter the
decision calculi of the beneficiaries of fiduciary duty-in general, the
principals-such as then changes the calculi of fiduciaries themselves, or
(b) change the principal on whose behalf the fiduciary is operating from a
private to a public such principal.
In either case (a) or case (b), it will be noticed, fiduciary duty is not
doing the real work. It is at best complementing the real work. What is
doing the real work is regulation. But more on this as we turn now to the
nature and structure of fiduciary relations and fiduciary obligation.
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III. FIDUCIARIES, BENEFICIARIES, AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
Most lawyers are at least passingly familiar with the concepts of
fiduciary relation and fiduciary obligation. Yet few of us seem to find time
to develop any particular general account of the fiduciary relation and the
form of obligation to which it gives rise. We tend to think instead in terms
of "laundry lists." We have a rough idea as to what statuses are considered
at law to be more or less fiduciary in character-trustees, corporate officers
and directors, business partners, lawyers, accountants, etc.-and of what
"the fiduciary duties" are: obedience, care, loyalty, perhaps "good faith."50
But we don't tend to think all that hard about what underlying principle it
is, precisely, that these lists reveal, unfold, or elaborate. I shall start, then,
by trying to get a bit of clarity on this point. Doing so will situate us to
appreciate more fully why fiduciaries of private sector market participants
are not well suited to addressing market-wide challenges such as recursive
collective action problems-hence, systemic financial dysfunction.
A. Duty, not Duties
The tendency to grasp at canonical manifestations of fiduciary
obligation ad seriatim while avoiding confrontation with the larger
question concerning "what fiduciary obligation is all about," I think,
occasions much avoidable confusion when we are confronted with new
situations that seem on the one hand intuitively to implicate fiduciary
obligation, while on the other hand not neatly conforming to any of the
well-worn "fact patterns." Thus, the Supreme Court of Delaware, for
example, uncertain whether to categorize the novel predicate transactions
in Disney as garden variety "duty of care" or "duty of loyalty"
circumstances, prompted all manner of speculation over whether a "new
fiduciary duty"-a "duty of good faith"-was finding its way into
Delaware corporate governance law." And thus, earlier, all the
consternation, followed by speculation about a "new jurisprudence of
corporate takeovers," when the same court set aside the business judgment
rule in a series of decisions, commencing with Smith v. Van Gorkom,52 that
commentators had theretofore assumed to be garden variety duty of care
cases.
50. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). More on the kerfuffle over a putatively
"new" fiduciary duty of good faith immediately below.
51. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52-53, 62-68 (Del. 2006)
(recounting the procedural history).
52. 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
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My own take on such episodes is that it is a mistake to think of
putatively distinct fiduciary duties as though they were well-defined,
contoured by separate "cookie cutters," and categorically different. It is
better to think in terms of one primal fiduciary obligation that is differently
implicated in different and ever-permutable transactional settings. The so-
called duty of care and duty of loyalty, on this understanding, are simply
manifestations of general fiduciary obligation that emerge in certain oft-
repeated contexts-those involving (a) situations in which heightened
attention is necessary to reap reasonable gain or avoid avoidable loss, and
(b) conflicted interests between fiduciaries and beneficiaries, respectively.
What, then, is the general fiduciary obligation?
I suggest that the general fiduciary obligation is, as the Latin radical
"fide" that lies at the core not only of fiduciary but also of "fidelity,"
"confidant," "infidel," and a host of other words suggests, to "keep faith"
with the beneficiary in whose favor the duty runs. It is to minimize, if not
eliminate, what I shall call the "space of interests" between fiduciary and
beneficiary within the context in which the fiduciary relation is operative. It
is, in effect, to be one's beneficiary within that context, to be her alter
ego-her "other self." It is to do as she likely would do were she not to
have need of a fiduciary to act in her stead in the first place.
The familiar "cookie cutter" fiduciary duties are readily understood as
manifestations of this "Ur"-obligation as brought to bear in particular oft-
recurring contexts. If I am less careful with a beneficiary's assets than that
beneficiary herself would have been had she not needed a fiduciary, I have
introduced space between myself and my beneficiary. I have allowed other
matters to occupy my attention at the expense of my beneficiary-other
matters that my beneficiary would not have thus "prioritized." Hence one
can say I have "violated a fiduciary duty of care," but it is more helpful-
less misleading in the long run-to say I have violated my fiduciary
obligation by being careless. I have failed to act as my beneficiary's alter
ego, and in so doing have "broken faith" with her. I have "violated her
trust," and in so doing have driven a wedge between us of which the
fiduciary relation does not admit.
Similarly, if I sell an asset to my fiduciary and attempt to get "top
dollar" for it in so doing just as if my beneficiary were a stranger, then
again I have introduced space between myself and my beneficiary.
Likewise if I take for myself some opportunity I was meant to be on the
lookout for on behalf of my beneficiary. Hence one can say I have
"violated a fiduciary duty of loyalty," but it is more helpful-less
misleading in the long run-to say I have violated my fiduciary obligation
by being disloyal. I have made myself my beneficiary's competitor rather
than her alter ego-once again acting more as my own ego than as her alter
ego just as I did when being careless in pursuit of her interests. In so doing
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 68:4:1071
I have violated my beneficiary's trust; I have broken faith with her. This is
the essence of the fiduciary relation, hence of fiduciary obligation. And
there are far more ways of violating it-even ways we have not yet
imagined-than are parceled out under the prefabricated headings of "care"
and "loyalty" in law school casebooks.53
B. Fiduciary Obligation as Status Obligation, Implied by Law
Fiduciary obligation, as is well-known, is a status obligation engaged
by operation of law even in the absence of deliberate contract,54 and this
hangs together with the nature of the obligation as just described. One can,
in other words, come to be a fiduciary, subject to fiduciary obligation,
without forthrightly embracing that status. This will occur quite
"automatically," for example, if one begins to act as an agent for another as
defined by the courts and memorialized in the Restatement (Third) of
Agency. 5 Likewise if one begins to act as a business partner as defined by
the courts and memorialized in the Uniform Partnership Act, or if one
agrees to serve as a trustee, or as an officer or director of a firm, or
becomes a lawyer or accountant and takes on a client, and so on.56 In some
cases, of course, parties can "contract out" of some of these obligations.
But the interesting thing for present purposes is where the default lies.
Why does our law operate in this manner? Why does it impute,
escapably or otherwise, community of interest or "ego-alterity" among
some pairs of persons but not others? Why does it saddle persons with
53. My account of the essence of fiduciary obligation as just elaborated is obviously distinct
from, but I don't think incompatible with, most of the few other general accounts on offer-e.g., those
of Gold, Markovits, and Miller. It is in somewhat greater tension, I think, with accounts that reduce
fiduciary obligations to "default" terms of fictitious contracts-notably those of Easterbrook, Fischel,
and Sitkoff-but only in the sense that, absent contractual provisions to the contrary, fiduciary defaults
on my account are apt to be more stringent than appears to be assumed on contract-based accounts. See,
e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties ofFiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW 176 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014); Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and
Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual Basis ofFiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 209; Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 63; see also Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of
Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra, at 197; Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 425 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 50; see also Miller, supra note 53.
55. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) ("Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and the
agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.").
56. See generally Legal Info. Inst., Fiduciary Duty, WEX LEGAL DICTIONARY,
https://www.law.comell.edu/wex/fiduciary duty (last updated July 2016).
57. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 53; see also Roberta Romano, Comment on
Easterbrook and Fischel, "Contract and Fiduciary Duty," 36 J.L. & ECON. 447 (1993).
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obligations to "close space" between themselves and others when they
behave in particular ways or take on particular statuses, even in situations
in which they are not fully cognizant of those implications? There appear to
be two related reasons, one narrow and the other broader, for the
recognition of fiduciary relations in our law.
The narrow reason seems to be that we want there to be certain
institutions through which people can deliberately act at a distance in
particular ways-even across that "infinite gulf' which separates the living
from the dead. The legal trust is, of course, the classic example-the very
name of the institution amounting to the English equivalent of fide itself.
Thus, if I have a descendent unable to care for himself and want to ensure
he is cared for even after I'm gone, I may seek a trustee to administer an
estate that I leave on his behalf. The trustee will then have discretionary
authority over the disposition of the estate assets, which she will be
required to exercise in a manner that keeps faith with me, the trust settlor,
and benefits the trust beneficiary as I myself would have endeavored to do
had I been able. No one need take on this role of trustee, but once she does
she'll be required to administer the estate as would I myself, or as would
my beneficiary were he competent. Here the automatic imputation of
fiduciary duty is effectively the provision of a "package deal" institution-
an institution that we as a legal culture have evidently decided to be worth
providing, be it in the form of "mandatory" or default rules.
The broader reason for imputing fiduciary obligation by operation of
law generalizes the narrower one. We appear as a legal culture to have
decided that there are certain forms of temporally extended cooperation or
collaboration that we should facilitate, even to the point of requiring, absent
deliberately stipulated contractual provisions to the contrary, those who
begin to act in the collaborative manners in question to "do it right" once
they've begun.58 Hence the law of agency enables me to establish
something reminiscent of a trust on behalf, not of a third-party beneficiary,
but even of myself, thereby vindicating, hence enabling, a certain form of
reliance. In enabling that form of reliance, in turn, the law facilitates my
delegating tasks, as principal to agent, that I would otherwise have to
pursue on my own. And hence the law of partnership enables two or more
people to be, in effect, simultaneously principals and agents to each other,
thereby vindicating, hence encouraging, a certain form of reliance and in so
doing facilitating temporally extended collaborative effort.
As for why we wish to facilitate this, doubtless there are both Smithian
and Aristotelian reasons at work. The Smithian reasons would have to do
58. The principle is not unlike that of estoppel more generally-another principle, which, like the
institution of the legal trust itself, has its origins in equity jurisprudence.
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with the division of labor and associated gains from specialization that
collaborative effort enables. 59 Greater productive efficiency, in other
words, is presumably had in virtue of temporally extended collaborative
effort, and the imputation of fiduciary obligation between collaborating
parties absent contract provisions "opting out" would seem to facilitate
such effort itself.
The Aristotelian reasons for this form of facilitation would sound in
what appear to be certain human propensities to work together for working
together's sake. Most legal scholars write much of their scholarship solo;
but many, if not most, also coauthor some, if not much, of their work. One
suspects that in many cases, this is not simply because collaborating in this
way is "more efficient"-often it isn't-but because it can be enriching in
its own right. Doubtless many a legal, accounting, or investment
professional would agree-at least up to a point. And so would many a tech
start-up or other small firm, to say nothing of orchestras, clubs, sporting
leagues, and the like, in all of which the "product" is necessarily, rather
than merely contingently, group-generated or group-provided.60
It is worth noting that the "incomplete contracts" explanation that many
microeconomically oriented lawyers offer for fiduciary obligation's
presence in our law is quite compatible with the conjectures that I have just
offered.6 1 Contracting itself, after all, can helpfully be viewed as a form of
collaboration-even if a decidedly "thinner," and often less lengthily
temporally extended, such form.62 As such, contracting itself offers both
Smithian efficiency and what I am calling Aristotelian mutuality benefits-
even if, again, in more attenuated form than we encounter in a long-term
relation between partners in a family or small firm. Hence we might wish
to facilitate contracting for reasons akin to those that we have for
facilitating longer-term fiduciary relations themselves.
And lo, the law actually does this. One way it fills gaps in contracts is
with something akin to, even if correspondingly thinner than, fiduciary
duty itself-viz., a duty of "good faith in performance."63 Another related
yet "thicker" way that it does so is by imputing something much like full-
bodied fiduciary obligation itself into relations we think parties would or
justifiably could have described in fiduciary terms had they sat down and
59. See, e.g., Legal Info. Inst., supra note 56.
60. See sources cited supra notes 53 and 57.
61. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 53. As observed at note 53, supra, I think my
account departs from contractual accounts more in respect of what it requires in the absence of contrary
contract terms than of anything else.
62. See, e.g., Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004).
63. See generally Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933); U.C.C.§ 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2014); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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specifically contracted. 4 In general, the longer-term or more open-ended a
contractual relation, the more reasonable each party's trust in and reliance
upon its implied terms, and hence the more willing the courts are to imply
certain fiduciary obligations into it absent express terms to the contrary.65
And this itself seems to testify to our legal culture's aim of facilitating joint
collaborative activity.
C. Financial Fiduciaries
Now, I trust you can see where this is all going. In Part II, I emphasized
systemic financial dysfunction's status as a set of what I called recursive
collective action problems-problems that issue in calamity and are
mediated not by defects in private sector market participants' rationality,
morality, or legality, but by their rationality and moral and legal neutrality
themselves. In this Part, in turn, I have emphasized the nature of fiduciary
obligation as essentially an obligation for the fiduciary in effect to be, as it
were, the beneficiary of her duty-to allow for no space between her own
interests and her beneficiary's interests.
But if this is the case, then it would seem impossible to address
systemic financial dysfunction by tweaking fiduciary obligation. We would
be barking up the wrong tree, so to speak. For the fiduciary is fully as
incapable of addressing the problem in this kind of case as her beneficiary
would be; and that is because, again, she just is her beneficiary, for
purposes of the relation, insofar as she is true to her fiduciary status. To put
the point another way-from the "other direction," as it were-we found
above that collective action problems require collective agents for their
solution. But a private sector fiduciary is not a collective agent; she is an
individual agent-an agent for her private sector principal alone.
64. See, e.g., St. John's Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 166 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[A]
fiduciary relationship embraces not only those the law has long adopted-such as trustee and
beneficiary-but also more informal relationships where it can be readily seen that one party reasonably
trusted another."); Whittle v. Ellis, 122 So. 2d 237, 239-40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) ("[T]he term
'fiduciary or confidential relation' is recognized as being very broad.. . . It embraces both technical
fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist wherever one man trusts in and relies upon
another."); Daniels v. Army Nat'l Bank, 822 P.2d 39, 42 (Kan. 1991) ("There are two types of fiduciary
relationships, those created by contract and those implied in law from the surrounding facts and the
relationship of the parties."); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Whiteman Tire, Inc., 935 P.2d 628, 634
(Wash. Ct. App. 1997) ("Fiduciary relationships include those historically regarded as fiduciary, and
also may arise in circumstances in which 'any person whose relation with another is such that the latter
justifiably expects his welfare to be cared for by the former."' (quoting Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d
1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980))).
65. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 64; see also Carmen D. Caruso, Franchising's Enlightened
Compromise: The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 26 FRANCHISE L.J. 207 (2007).
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Private sector fiduciaries, then, can no more address systemic financial
dysfunction than can private sector market participants themselves. The
space-closing nature of fiduciary obligation renders them functionally
identical to those participants, who in their individual capacities are quite
incapable of solving collective action problems.
The only way around this fundamental defect in the fiduciary duty
approach to addressing systemic financial dysfunction, I think, is
accordingly either (a) to address the incentives of private sector market
participants themselves as described above in Part II.C-i.e., to regulate;
(b) to override private sector fiduciaries' obligations to their private sector
principals-i.e., again to regulate, and now in so doing to render them no
longer fiduciaries; or (c) to change the status of certain private sector
fiduciaries altogether, so as to render them public sector fiduciaries.
I'll consider each of these alternatives in due course. First, however, I
should address one anticipated objection. This is that fiduciary relations
and obligation as I have thus far elaborated them might well be, as I've
said, where fiduciaries act on behalf of individual human beings, but are
quite different where they act on behalf of organizations-different in ways
that open more options for using fiduciary duty to address systemic
financial dysfunction than (a) through (c) just above would imply.
D. Duty to Organizations?
The discussion of the fiduciary relation and fiduciary obligation above
seems intuitively tractable enough when we confine ourselves to relations
among small numbers of human persons--e.g., two doctors who start a
medical practice, an author and the literary agent whom she retains, or a
manufacturer and a raw materials provider who enter into a long-term
supply contract. But what of more complex organizational forms, such as
business corporations? Given that corporate officers and directors are
fiduciaries, who-or what-are the beneficiaries of their fiduciary
obligation?
Although it seems seldom, if ever, remarked, there is actually
something of a categorical "disconnect" between the concept of a fiduciary
relation on the one hand and a "corporate person" as a possible term of
such a relation on the other hand. The reason is straightforward: If a
fiduciary is to be understood as a sort of "alter ego" of the beneficiary, it is
hard to make sense of a corporate fiduciary because it is hard to make sense
of a "corporate ego." What is it, in other words, to close or minimize the
space of interests between a human agent and an inanimate entity? And for
that matter, what can it be for an inanimate entity to have "interests"?
Corporate entities do not seem to have, strictly speaking, wishes or
desires-they do not even have, it would seem, long-term plans or
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ambitions. To impute such motivations to a firm is typically to project onto
the firm the wishes, desires, plans, or ambitions of one or more of its
human constituents. The problem with doing this in the case of a large,
complex firm, however, is, of course, that there will tend to be multiple
human constituents, many of whom hold conflicting wishes, desires, plans,
or ambitions, not to mention differing time horizons. What then to do? Is
fiduciary law simply out of place in the case of the complex organization?
Has the law been drawn into a category error or overworked analogy in
developing in a manner that imputes fiduciary obligation to certain officers
and directors of firms?
Maybe. But then again, maybe not. There does appear to be at least one
objective that all firm constituents, even corporate constituents, will be apt
to agree upon in most circumstances. And insofar as that is the case, we can
make at least some sense of a corporate fiduciary's being the alter ego of
her firm. As we shall see, however, this doesn't in the end help when it
comes to the proposal to use private sector fiduciaries to address systemic
financial dysfunction. For pursuing this objective will, in nearly all cases,
render the corporate fiduciary even more like a private sector market
participant whose rational pursuit of legally neutral objectives is, thanks to
the recap-nature of systemic financial dysfunction, part of the problem
itself.
Here's what I mean. The law typically handles the complexity problem
that large organizations pose to the fiduciary relation by unpacking
fiduciary obligation to the incorporated firm as an obligation (a) at least not
to compete with the firm, and (b) to exercise plausible "business judgment"
in pursuit of raising the value of the firm.66
With respect to (a), the idea is to impose a version of the traditional
loyalty requirement, essentially by ensuring that any transaction between
fiduciary and firm, or any appropriation of what might have been a firm's
opportunity by the fiduciary, has, as a procedural matter, been approved by
fully informed and financially disinterested shareholders or fellow
fiduciaries, and as a substantive matter, has not been obviously unfair to the
firm.6 7 This seems to be easy enough-that is, sufficiently analogous to
what "loyalty" entails in more purely person-to-person fiduciary dyads-if
we can make sense of "value" as referenced in (b).
With respect to (b), the idea is that working to maximize the value of
the firm is, in most cases, the best way to satisfy all, rather than merely
some, of the firm's many human constituents with many potentially
66. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 & n.62, 74 (Del. 2006).
67. See id.
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conflicting interests. 6 8 That is because to maximize value is to maximize
the worth of residual claims, while residual claims amount to nothing at all
until prior creditors-including lenders, bondholders, employees,
transaction counterparties, etc.-are satisfied.69
Focusing upon value, then, appears to offer a means of
commensurating and reducing to one metric what would otherwise be a
host of potentially conflicting claims that no single fiduciary or body of
fiduciaries could coherently aim to satisfy. It seems thereby to enable us
straightforwardly to carry over to the case of the firm the fiduciary's more
familiar obligation to flesh-and-blood human persons.
E. "Value-Maximizing" as Fiduciary Obligation
The matter of exercising business judgment to maximize firm value is
not quite as simple as it might initially look, however. And the law's use of
the notion of business judgment in articulating this face of fiduciary duty
can be helpfully viewed as stemming in part from precisely this lack of
simplicity. Part of the problem here is that firms often persist over lengthy
spans of time, meaning that maximizing value can be understood over
varying temporal durations. We can speak coherently of maximizing value
"in the long run," "in the short run," or over anything in between. What,
then, is actually meant by value-maximizing?
Were knowledge of all possible future contingencies complete, and
were markets in firm shares fully efficient in impounding all and only such
knowledge into share prices, there would be little space between short-term
and long-term where value is concerned. 70 And so in that case, value-
maximization might indeed be a simple, not multivalent, imperative. But
there never has been, and never will be, such knowledge, nor are markets
strongly efficient in the requisite sense.n Partly for this reason, the law
affords wide latitude to corporate fiduciaries in choosing between
prospective firm projects that offer different payouts over different time
68. See, for example, Chancellor Allen's widely discussed opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Comnc'ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30,
1991).
69. See Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 441 n.8
(1992) ("Common stock represents the residual claim to a corporation's earnings and assets after the
corporation satisfies its obligations to creditors and any "preferred" stockholder with a superior
claim.").
70. The world would look as envisaged in GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALuE: AN AXIOMATIC
ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM (1959).
71. Empirically, the form of informational efficiency that the most familiar financial markets can
boast appears to be the "semi-strong" variety. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
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horizons. This it does under the rubric of the so-called business judgment
rule (BJR). 7 2
The fact that a project with a deferred payout might offer the same (or
even a higher) "net present value" (NPV) as another project with an
immediate payout is one reason for the BJR. Another is that different
projects with different likelihoods of succeeding also can offer the same
NPVs-in this case, the same "risk-adjusted" NPVs. A coin toss offering
$200 or nothing is worth the same as a $100 sure bet just as surely as $210
a year from now is worth $200 now if the prevailing interest rate is 5%.
The BJR accordingly also offers corporate fiduciaries latitude in choosing
between projects offering similar risk-adjusted NPVs.
In effect, the law views the firm as a well-diversified individual
endowed with a perpetual lifespan, and hence considers the firm qua firm
to be rationally indifferent both as between more and less risky projects and
as between longer and shorter term payouts, so long as risk-adjusted NPVs
are the same. The BJR accordingly aims to eliminate "space" between firm
and fiduciary by rendering the latter just as time- and risk-indifferent as the
firm itself would rationally be were it an immortal human being holding a
well-diversified investment portfolio. In this sense, the BJR can be viewed
as an essential element of fiduciary obligation itself when the beneficiary of
the obligation is not a mortal human being with a possibly idiosyncratic
portfolio or idiosyncratic preferences, but a perpetually existent firm with
many distinct human beings as constituents.
F. Value Maximization and Financial Dysfunction: What's Rationalfor
the Corporate Beneficiary Also is Rationalfor the Fiduciary
But now note that here too, then, fiduciary duty, if owed to private
sector market-participating firms, offers no cure for systemic financial
dysfunction. If asset price bubbles and busts are in the nature of recursive
collective action problems as argued above, then there is no more defect in
a firm's decision to buy as a bubble inflates and to sell as the bubble
deflates than there is in a human being's decision to do so. Indeed it is
irrational for the firm not to do so if it is capable of holding a diversified
portfolio and has an indefinite lifespan. And a fiduciary for this firm will be
more or less obligated to act likewise on the firm's behalf, lest there be
space between fiduciary and firm.
The BJR, it is true, will afford her some latitude to temper her firm's
participation in a bubble or bust, essentially by recognizing that she might
reasonably decide it best to lengthen the time horizon over which she is
72. See Legal Info. Inst., supra note 56.
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maximizing or to assign different probability weightings to various possible
investment outcomes. But this is in keeping with the nature of her fiduciary
status itself where the beneficiary is a complex firm. Requiring her not to
do as the rational human decision maker might well do during a bubble or
bust, by contrast, would not be to tinker with her fiduciary status and
obligation. It would be to sever it-at least as a private law relation
between private sector fiduciary and private sector firm.
The private sector fiduciary qua private sector fiduciary, then, is caught
up in the "tragedy" that is the recursive collective action problem that is the
bubble or bust just as surely as is any individual who trades on her own
account. And that is the case, we can see, whether her beneficiary be such a
person or a complex, incorporated firm. There is no plausible case to be
made, on the basis of her buying during a boom or selling during a bust, to
the effect that she's "careless," "disloyal," or in any other way breaking
faith with anyone. How, then, if at all, is fiduciary duty to assist us in
addressing systemic financial dysfunction?
IV. ARE BANK FIDUCIARIES DIFFERENT?
It might be argued that I am still being too quick to dismiss private law
fiduciary duties as means of getting at systemic financial dysfunction. One
might propose, for example, that under certain extreme circumstances,
fiduciary duties can be made to "shift" or in some other way change. And
these circumstances might be characterized in a manner that seems
especially to implicate bank and other financial fiduciaries. Perhaps, then,
bank (and shadow bank) fiduciaries are special, just as banks themselves
are said to be special-in ways that alter the fiduciary calculus.
I shall argue that bank fiduciaries are indeed special in a manner that
tracks the ways in which banks are special. I shall also argue, however, that
the way in which banks are special has thus far been inadequately
elaborated. And the way in which banks really are special, I'll argue, is a
way that renders them not really private sector institutions at all. This in
turn means their fiduciaries cannot really be private law fiduciaries. In the
end, then, ironically, I am going to agree that fiduciary obligation can, in a
sense unintended by advocates of fiduciary solutions to financial fragility,
serve as a tool for addressing systemic financial dysfunction. But this is
simply because financial firms are best viewed as primarily public
institutions and their fiduciaries correspondingly as public fiduciaries.
I'll start with previous proposals that rely on fiduciary duty to deal with
financial dysfunction. Then I shall come to my own claim by highlighting
both what is sound and what is unsound in those proposals.
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A. Creditors as Special Beneficiaries: Proposals
Because, as noted before, financial firms rely heavily on debt to fund
their investment activity and accordingly bring considerable insolvency
risk into the financial system, it is perhaps unsurprising that the closest
analogues from earlier times to latter-day proposals to "redirect" fiduciary
duty themselves focus on insolvency risk and creditor interests. Thus, for
example, Chancellor Allen suggested from the bench decades back that in
"the vicinity of insolvency," 73 corporate fiduciaries' duties should run to
the benefit of firm creditors rather than shareholders since, at that point, it
is more important to salvage what is left of the firm than to try going
"double or nothing." 74 Perhaps something similar could be said of firms
whose principal constituents always are creditors rather than equity
investors-namely, banks and shadow banks?
As if to act on that hint, Macey and O'Hara have more recently
suggested that, since banks fund themselves primarily with short-term debt
(in the form of depositor accounts) rather than equity, bank fiduciaries'
obligations should run either to the debt suppliers or to whoever takes on
the risk borne by the same-in the United States, for example, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.75 Concentrating on this proposal's
resemblance to Chancellor Allen's, we might conclude that the shared idea
here is that the firm should be viewed as possessed of the same risk tastes
as its principal funders, who, in the case of the generic firm in hard times
and the bank at all times, are creditors rather than equity investors. And
since creditors are by definition more risk averse than equity investors, a
corollary would seem to be that firm fiduciaries in these cases should be
more cautious and less entrepreneurial.
Radiating out further, Armour and Gordon more recently still have
suggested that, at least in the case of large, systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs), fiduciaries' obligation to shareholders themselves
should be understood in something other than share-price-maximizing
terms, since for a firm to be systemically important is precisely for it to be
capable of imperiling that portion of shareholder portfolio risk that cannot
be diversified away-viz., that portion known as "market risk." 76 Here it is
as if the SIFI fiduciary had a duty to maximize not the value of the SIFI for
its shareholders (and therefore others) but the value of the full portfolios of
73. Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34.
74. See id
75. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks, 9 FRBNY
ECON. POL'Y REv. 91, 91 (2003).




these shareholders-including those portions that are not issued by the
SIFI.
B. Why These Proposals Don't Work as Fiduciary Reforms
There is something intuitively plausible, even attractive, about all of
these suggestions. I myself am drawn to them. In the final analysis,
however, I think it probably an abuse of doctrine, language, and ultimately
programmatic coherence itself to claim that these suggestions have much, if
anything, to do with bona fide fiduciary obligation.
These are proposals, not to interpret fiduciary obligation more
faithfully, nor even to tweak fiduciary obligation as it presently stands, but
rather to displace fiduciary duty with something else altogether-namely,
with regulation. We are proposing, in effect, to override what fiduciary
duty would ordinarily require in the case of the complex organization-
viz., value maximization-in the name of requiring something else. And
we are doing so because we have decided the "something else" to be more
important than the ordinary beneficiary's-the firm's-interest.
The only exception to this claim will be that which will be presented if
we decide that the officers or directors of some firms are never, in fact,
fiduciaries of those firms, but are fiduciaries of the public instead. That is
not as far-fetched as it might initially sound, so I shall come back to it. But
first I must explain why there is no other option that actually keeps faith
with the notion of fiduciary relation or obligation.
In the case of the firm, we have noted, the only way to make sense of
the fiduciary imperative is to interpret it as attempting to maximize firm
value over some time horizon in a risk-indifferent manner. But now note
what this means in the form of a hypothetical scenario: We'll suppose that
a firm is hovering near insolvency, but still is worth $100 million-
precisely enough to leave all of its creditors whole in liquidation. One
possible "project" that the firm's fiduciaries might undertake, then, is that
of making no further investments, but instead standing pat or perhaps even
liquidating the firm. Let's suppose likewise, however, that there also are
other prospective projects before the firm offering various risk-weighted
NPVs, and that the option offering the highest such risk-weighted NPV is
the one offering, say, a 1% chance of yielding $1 trillion. In this case it is
quite clear that this latter option is that which is best "for the firm"-by
far-and hence is the one most apt to be entailed by any "fiduciary duty to
the firm."
If, then, we decide with Chancellor Allen that in the vicinity of
insolvency, the firm's fiduciary ought to concentrate instead upon
1108 [Vol. 68*1071
Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?
preserving what is left of the firm for its creditors 7 7-as I, for one, would
certainly be tempted to advocate-then what we are saying is that now all
bets, quite literally, are off. But this means the erstwhile firm fiduciary now
is no longer a firm fiduciary at all. She is scarcely a fiduciary even for the
firm's creditors, inasmuch as she has been divested of discretionary
authority and been made something more like a custodian, charged simply
with ensuring that no more of the soon-to-be bankrupt estate is lost. A lock,
in effect, has been put on the assets, and the erstwhile fiduciary is now just
a watchman. This might well be very good policy, but the point is we're no
longer relying on fiduciary duty but overriding it.
Much the same holds of Macey and O'Hara's proposal to hold bank
fiduciaries to a higher standard of care than we do other firm fiduciaries in
view of the risk tastes of the banks' primary funders-creditor/depositors.
If we hold that a bank's fiduciary duties run to the firm's creditors-its
depositors-rather than to the firm as a whole simply because the
depositors are the primary suppliers of funds to the firm, and we do so
notwithstanding that these depositors have contracted for a fixed rate of
return, then we are effectively saying that the bank's officers and directors
are mere custodians of depositor funds rather than fiduciaries of banking
finns. That is to drain the concept of a fiduciary of nearly all of its
discretionary content, much as does Chancellor Allen's proposal.
Finally, Armour and Gordon's proposal drains the concept of a
fiduciary of content "in the opposite direction," so to speak, to that in
which Allen, Macey, and O'Hara do. Whereas the latter narrow the duty
once owed the firm to a quite minimal duty now owed solely to the class of
firm constituents who would prefer that the fiduciary have virtually no
discretion at all in the management of assets, Armour and Gordon broaden
the duty, to the point that the SIFI fiduciary must avoid acting in manners
that might adversely affect even the non-SIFI-issued instruments in the
SIFI-shareholders' portfolios.79
We can call these proposals "proposals to alter financial fiduciaries'
fiduciary duties" if we like, but then we shall simply be playing on words.
What we are actually doing in all of these cases is overriding fiduciary
obligation as long understood. We are saying that there are circumstances
in which some imperatives are more important than those that fiduciaries
ordinarily pursue on behalf of their beneficiaries. To say that the fiduciary
duties themselves shift in these cases, I suggest, only muddies the waters. It
clouds understanding and gradually drains the concept of a fiduciary of its
77. See Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 & n.55.
78. See Macey & O'Hara, supra note 75, at 102.
79. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 76, at 76-77.
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distinctive content. "Fiduciary obligation" becomes little more than "legal
requirement."
It seems to me there are but two ways of avoiding this undesirable
result, even while recognizing and vindicating the overriding imperatives
that prompt the proposals here noted. And only one of them actually
involves a change to fiduciary obligation.
The first way is simply and forthrightly to regulate-and to do so in a
manner that enters into the ordinary fiduciary's value calculations
themselves just as they would a human beneficiary's value calculations. If,
for example, heavy-truly heavy-fines attach to firm actions that violate
some macroprudentially imposed capital requirement during a boom,
violation of this requirement will significantly affect firm value itself. The
value-conscious fiduciary will accordingly act in conformity with the
requirement. Note that in this case, there has been no "fiduciary reform,"
nor is fiduciary duty really doing the primary work. Regulation is doing the
primary work, and fiduciary duty is here parasitic upon it.
The only other way to address systemic financial dysfunction through
fiduciary duty without doing violence to the concept of fiduciary obligation
itself, I suggest, is radically, comprehensively, and permanently to re-
identify the beneficiary of fiduciary obligation in the case of banks and
other financial firms. A strong case can be made, I shall now argue in
closing, for naming the public, as represented by its central bank or cognate
instrumentality, as the actual principal and the actual beneficiary of all
fiduciary obligations owed by the directors and officers of banks and other
financial firms. In order to make this case out, I must now say a bit about
the "public-private franchise view" of finance that my frequent
collaborator and I have developed over the last several years.
C. The "Finance Franchise "-and the Role ofFiduciaries Therein
Banks are indeed special in the ways that bank regulators have long
recited. They engage in valuable maturity transformation that affords
liquidity to the financial markets and broader economy; they are, in
consequence, vulnerable to runs; they serve as critical nodes of the
payments system, and of course, furnish the oft-cited "transmission belt" of
central bank monetary policy. Much the same now can be said of the
"shadow banking" sector as well. None of these features render bank
fiduciaries special, however, save in the trivial sense that they, through the
banks that they work for or oversee, must comply with a broader array of
regulatory requirements than must the fiduciaries of less special firms.
There is another way of characterizing what is truly special about
banks and the broader financial system, however, pursuant to which
financial fiduciaries can be viewed as (nontrivially) special as well. This is
[Vol. 68:4:10711110
Are Bank Fiduciaries Special?
as public or quasi-public instrumentalities. I allude to the franchise view of
finance that my frequent coauthor and I have been developing over the past
several years.80
Pursuant to the franchise view of finance, banks and other financial
institutions are best viewed as franchisees that distribute a vital public
resource-viz., the monetized full faith and credit of the sovereign public.8 1
If one attends carefully at how bank and other financial institutions'
lending and deposit-opening transactions actually occur, it becomes quickly
apparent that the bulk of deposits are not constituted by pre-accumulated
private capital brought in by virtuous savers who then make lending
activity possible, but rather by bank credit itself.82 Banks and other
institutions make loans, in other words, and do so by opening or crediting
borrower accounts ex nihilo. 83 To reduce this to a slogan, "loans make
deposits" more than "deposits make loans."
What makes this possible are the acts of Federal Reserve
"accommodation" and "monetization."84 In essence, our central bank,
acting in the name of the public, recognizes and redeems drafts drawn upon
bank loan-created accounts, and these drafts are accordingly spendable as
money.85 But what this means, in turn, is that the Fed is actually
substituting its own creditworthiness-hence the public full faith and
credit-for that of individual borrowers whose accounts are lending banks
credit. In effect, it is authorizing the private banking institutions whose
loans and associated borrower deposits it accommodates to distribute a
vital financial resource-the monetized full faith and credit of the United
States.86
Insofar as this is the case, banks and other financial institutions are, in
effect, licensed distributors for the United States itself. They distribute its
credit money. In this sense they are public instrumentalities. They can be
likened to franchisees who distribute a franchisor's product and earn
profits-in effect, privatized seigniorage-for doing so. At its best, the
arrangement capitalizes upon each party's comparative advantage. The
franchisor has macro-informational advantages in determining credit
aggregates in the financial system and can accordingly act to modulate
80. See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017); see also Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, "Special, " Vestigial, or
Visionary? What Bank Regulation Tells Us About the Corporation-and Vice Versa, 39 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 453 (2016) [hereinafter Hockett & Omarova, "Special, " Vestigial, or Visionary?].
81. See sources cited supra note 80.
82. See sources cited supra note 80.
83. See sources cited supra note 80.
84. See sources cited supra note 80.
85. See sources cited supra note 80.
86. See sources cited supra note 80.
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these aggregates so as to head off bubble-fueling overissuance and bust-
causing underissuance of credit money.8 The franchisees have some-
though not absolute-micro-informational advantages in determining the
real risks and prospective rewards associated with various lending and
other investment opportunities. 8 Ideally, then, the franchisor and
franchisee get monetized public full faith and credit out into the economy
in the right amounts and in the right directions.8 9
Of course, the system as we currently find it does not function quite in
keeping with the ideal. Part of the reason, I think, is that the system's true
nature is not fully appreciated by the franchisor or the franchisee. Owing to
the pervasive influence of the false "intermediated scarce private capital"
myth of finance, pursuant to which financial institutions are claimed
actually to channel pre-accumulated scarce private capital from private
suppliers to end users and government instrumentalities simply "regulate"
from the "outside,"90 the state takes a rather more passive role in the
financial system than its true role both justifies and requires. For the same
reason, financial institutions themselves feel entitled, and lobby
accordingly, to roles and privileges that are not properly theirs. And news
media and many academics, themselves in the grip of the false picture, help
to keep the myth alive.
What is needed before all else, then, is to re-educate ourselves on the
true functioning of the financial system-a desideratum my coauthor,
Professor Omarova, and I are now attempting to meet in other work.91 But
what does all of this imply, if anything, for the obligations of financial
fiduciaries?
It might be thought initially, in view of the franchise metaphor I am
employing here, that the law governing franchisor-franchisee relations
might offer a clue. As it happens, however, that isn't the case. There are
two reasons. The first is that, in most jurisdictions, the franchise relation is
not cognized as a strictly fiduciary one. It is treated as something more like
a long-term relational contract.9 2 That entails obligations of good faith, to
be sure, but these are thin obligations, essentially duties not to exploit
vulnerabilities or otherwise behave opportunistically. 93
87. See sources cited supra note 80; see also Hockett & Ornarova, Public Actors in Private
Markets, supra note 30.
88. See sources cited supra note 87.
89. See sources cited supra note 80.
90. See sources cited supra note 80.
91. See sources cited supra note 80.
92. See, e.g., Zachary D. Schorr, Fading Fiduciary Duties Between Franchisors and Franchisees,
Bus. TORTS J., Winter 2010, at 13; see also Caruso, supra note 65.
93. See Caruso, supra note 65, at 208-09.
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The second reason is that, in the few jurisdictions that have found full-
blown fiduciary characteristics in the franchise relation, these have run
primarily in favor of the franchisee rather than the franchisor-owing to the
greater ease, it seems, with which petroleum companies like Sunoco or fast
food firms like McDonald's have been able to exploit single station or store
proprietors than vice versa.94 Where understanding the proper obligations
of financial firms in the finance franchise is concerned, then, the franchise
metaphor might not actually be all that helpful. How, then, to make use of
fiduciary concepts in better managing systemically significant finance?
I think there are probably only two routes to go, both of which
Professor Omarova and I are exploring in other work.95 The first route is to
think of banks and other financial institutions as, in effect, straightforward
agents of the public or of the central bank that acts in the name of the
public. These institutions' officers and directors might then be cast,
derivatively, as themselves agents of the same. And insofar as that is the
case, they would in effect be under fiduciary obligations to the public, or to
the central bank that acts in the name of the public.
Of course, it is not clear whether this itself would be much more than a
metaphorical way of speaking or thinking. What sense can we make, for
example, of the notion of a fiduciary duty of loyalty when the state does not
pursue profits and hence cannot be "competed with" by its fiduciaries? The
notions of fiduciary relation and associated obligation ultimately derive
from, and in that sense are perhaps truly at home in, "private" law-the
norms governing relations between members of civil society. And though
there appears to be something of a flowering of writing right now about
whether and how public officials might have fiduciary obligations,96 it is
not immediately obvious that such conceptual extension can do any work
that regulation and criminal law-in short, public law-cannot itself
already do. (When you wrong me, I sue you, citing some bit of private
law-contract, tort, fiduciary law, etc. When you wrong the public, "the
people" sue you, citing some bit of public law-regulatory provisions, the
criminal code, etc.)
94. See Schorr, supra note 92, at 13-15.
95. See Hockett & Omarova, sources cited supra notes 30 and 80. See also Robert C. Hockett &
Saule T. Omarova, Private Wealth and Public Goods: A Case for a National Investment Authority, 43 J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Hockett & Omarova, National Investment Authority].
96. See, e.g., EVAN Fox-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY'S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011);
Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006); Sung
Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm
Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845 (2013); Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699 (2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 671 (2013).
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Perhaps, however, there is at least something to be said for the tonal
value that thinking and speaking in fiduciary terms here might offer. After
all, when someone is fined for a regulatory infraction, the matter seems to
be seen almost as a kind of transaction-the fine is "part of the cost of
doing business," and once it is paid, no residue of opprobrium usually
lingers. If one is thought and said to violate the public trust or "break faith
with the people," by contrast, there is an air of high moral seriousness
about the thing, and one can well imagine a bank executive who is
successfully sued for such an offense being viewed askance in the future in
consequence.
It might, then, make sense to legislate to the effect that officers and
directors of banks and many other financial institutions are indeed
fiduciaries of the public, owing their government overseers duties of care,
candor, and other obligations sounding in the public trust in and reliance
upon them as managers of a vital public resource-the monetized full faith
and credit of the United States. If nothing else, the "Gestalt" carried by this
framing could not but be salutary, particularly given the pervasiveness of
the utterly false intermediated scarce private capital myth.
The other way in which something at least akin to fiduciary obligation
might be employed to address systemic financial dysfunction and justified
by reference to the franchise view of finance is a bit less "total" than that
just suggested. It might be thought of in this sense as a more
"incrementalist" step to experiment with. Here I allude to the "golden
share" idea that Professor Omarova and I have been thinking through in
other work, 97 and that Professor Omarova discusses in comprehensive
detail in her contribution to this symposium.98
The idea in this case, in brief, is to recognize the public role in the
financial system by making the government, through an entity constituted
for this and perhaps also cognate purposes, the holder of a kind of share in
all significant financial institutions. This share would not need to entitle the
government to dividends or any other kind of cash flow. Rather, it would
carry control rights, triggered by certain systemically portentous events
requiring the state's temporarily taking a more active role in managing
financial institutions. The golden share would, of course, entitle the holder
to board representation, and the board member(s) in question would have at
least as much book and record access as any other board member. This in
turn would be used partly for continuous monitoring with a view ultimately
97. See Hockett & Omarova, Public Actors in Private Markets, supra note 30; see also Hockett
& Omarova, "Special," Vestigial, or Visionary?, supra note 80; Hockett & Omarova, National
Investment Authority, supra note 95.
98. See Saule T. Omarova, Bank Governance and Systemic Stability: The "Golden Share"
Approach, 68 ALA. L. REv. 1029 (2017).
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to the compatibility of bank decisions with public purposes. But it would
also be used, of course, to facilitate rapid determination of what must be
done in the event of systemic tremors.
This "manager of last resort" function, as we see it, would not quite
amount to the wholesale conversion of private sector bank fiduciaries into
public fiduciaries. But it would place a public fiduciary into the same
boardroom with those who have thus far exclusively been private
fiduciaries. And it would give that public fiduciary pride of place-a sort of
"super chairmanship"--during particularly tumultuous times, such as those
of the autumn of 2008. This is the only other sense, I suspect, in which
something like fiduciary obligation on the part of bank officers or directors
can offer us anything of value in dealing with systemic financial
dysfunction-which is, again, in the final analysis, qua recursive collective
action problem, something that is only addressable via collective, not
individual, agency.
V. CONCLUSION
I have covered a sizable piece of ground here, and have done so in
order to reach what some might take for a negative, even pessimistic,
conclusion. Private law fiduciary obligation, I have argued, offers us little
to no help in addressing systemic financial dysfunction. That is owing to
the latter's stemming from what I have described as recursive collective
action problems, and to the former's binding fiduciaries to the very parties
whose individual rationality is what fuels the characteristic dynamic of
such problems in the first place.
What I have done here might also be taken for positive, even
optimistic, however. For I have argued that the only way out is to recognize
banks and other financial institutions for the de facto public
instrumentalities that they are, and then treat their governance as a matter
of public, not private, fiduciary relation and obligation.
This should not, in the final analysis, be viewed as anything but good
news. Nor should it be found all that surprising. Recursive collective action
problems, like other collective action problems, require collective agency
for their solution; individual agency is no help at all-it is the problem.
Scarce wonder, then, that the agents required to solve the financial
renditions of such problems should be collective agents. Scarce wonder,
that is, that they should be public fiduciaries.
